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July 2015
Lessons Not to Learn About Merger
Roger Bernhardt

Ram’s Gate Winery v Roche
Ram’s Gate Winery, LLC v Roche (2015) 235 CA4th 1071 teaches lessons that both
transactional and litigation attorneys should not particularly want to learn. These lessons suggest
that the old common law doctrine of merger can be safely ignored, whereas clients could suffer
unpleasant consequences if those issues are not securely covered in the contract.
The decision is more fully reported on p 107, but its basic facts are that the plaintiff
purchasers signed a contract with defendant vendors to acquire their winery, closed escrow on
the deal, and a year later claimed that the winery’s location on an earthquake fault had not been
disclosed to them as the contract required. The vendors responded that the fault had been
disclosed, and—more importantly—that their contractual disclosure obligation had been
“merged” into the deed they had accepted at the closing, thereby extinguishing that previous
obligation in the contract.
Any seller’s liability for nondisclosure that sounds in tort rather than contract is probably not
subject to a merger defense. Buyers who have not discovered a “hidden” defect until later
(usually when they have taken possession) are able to sue for fraud or negligent
misrepresentation for as long after close of escrow as the statute of limitations permits (usually 3
years after discovery; see CCP §338(d)). But Ram’s Gate involved a contractual disclosure
obligation comparable to the tort obligation to disclose all facts materially affecting value (which
I’ll call the “disclosure clause”).
The inclusion of that disclosure clause in the contract induced the purchasers to add a cause
of action for breach of contract to their complaint (and, later, to abandon their nondisclosure tort
causes of action entirely). The vendors’ motion for summary judgment asserted that the
disclosure provision had merged into the deed and that the noninclusion of any similar disclosure
language in that document meant the purchasers no longer had any supportable basis for
claiming that a contractual duty to disclose still existed. Worse, while the contract did provide
for the postclosing continuation of some of its obligations, the disclosure provision was not in
that list of surviving provisions. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion. The
purchasers responded by dismissing their tort causes of action, standing on their contract claim,
and appealing the adverse ruling on it and the dismissal of their case. The court of appeal
validated their strategy
.
Merger of Contract Provisions Into Deeds
A major drawback of basing a lawsuit on a provision in a real estate sales contract is that if
the purchase has already been consummated, the provision may be deemed merged out of
existence. Real estate sales contracts are generally executory, intended by both vendor and
purchaser to govern their relationship only until their respective performances have been
completed and escrow has closed. Purchasers use their generally allotted 30 to 90 days to
accomplish their due diligence investigations of the condition of the property (and to assemble

the funds necessary to pay for their purchase), while vendors take the steps necessary to make
their titles marketable or otherwise satisfactory to their purchasers. At the end of this period,
their escrow agent swaps what it has been given, handing the vendor’s deed to the purchaser and
the money paid by the purchasers to the vendor. (The parties might now be also called grantor
and grantee, and the former purchaser is now not merely the equitable owner of the land but also
its legal owner. The executory contract has accomplished its purposes, has been executed, and is
generally gone, once escrow closes.)
One aspect of the executory feature of such an arrangement is that either party could have
refused to close the deal if the performance tendered by the other was not what the contract
required. A purchaser may refuse to pay the price if the title or physical condition of the property
is not what the contract called for. The right way to object to inadequate performance of an
executory real estate sales contract is to refuse to close when the critical moment has arrived;
indeed, objecting sooner than that may be an anticipatory breach.
The flip side of that proposition is that once a purchaser has accepted his vendor’s
performance, the time for objecting or complaining about its inadequacies has probably passed.
Since a party’s basic contractual right is to refuse to close, engaging in a close ends that right to
decline to close. It is this feature that is generally described in legal shorthand by saying that a
purchaser’s contract rights have merged into his deed. From then on, whatever rights he has must
derive from his deed, rather than from his old contract.
This version of the merger doctrine works sensibly for some features of a real estate sales
contract, but it is a silly doctrine when applied categorically. The Uniform Land Transactions
Act, approved by the National Conference on Uniform State Laws in 1975, proposed to eliminate
the doctrine of merger entirely, but no jurisdiction ever adopted it. See Brown, Symposium
Article: What Ever Happened to the Uniform Land Transactions Act?, 20 Nova L Rev 1017
(Spring 1996). A purchaser often wants greater protection than abrupt merger and termination
afford after close of escrow.
Our legal system allows a party to obtain more security by acting appropriately. For
example, the purchaser can (in the contract) call for a grant deed rather than a quitclaim deed,
thereby gaining the protection of some statutorily implied covenants (i.e., that his grantor has not
previously conveyed the property to anyone else, and that she has not personally permitted any
encumbrances to burden her title). CC §1113. But nondisclosure of an existing earthquake fault
would hardly amount to a breach of either one of those “special” covenants—she did not cause
any tremors.
The contract may also require other explicit warranties from the grantor to be included in the
deed, often done when the land purchased will include a new structure on it, which the seller
warrants will be—for some time thereafter—free of defects or of merchantable quality. That
device effectively guarantees the continuation of some contract provision, either by converting it
into a longer-lasting deed provision or by providing in the contract for its continuation after close
of escrow.
A court may do the same by treating the covenant as “collateral” whose termination at close
of escrow is either deemed inconsistent or incompatible with the intent of the parties, like a
seller’s promise in January to make an improvement to the property as soon as the snow melts or
when the necessary materials or permits arrive. The covenant in this case, however (to disclose
within the first 10 days of the contract), hardly seems to fit within that “collateral” category, but
the court finessed this point by redefining the word in terms of relationship to the deed rather
than to the sales contract, enabling it to not even get to the question of inconsistency (although,

personally, I think such a characterization more removed the provision away from the collateral
covenant exception rather than bringing it within it). The “intent to survive” requirement was
held satisfied by the purchasers’ statement that it was their intention to have that provision
“continue after close of escrow,” somewhat ignoring the integration clause in the contract and its
parol evidence consequences. (The court also got around merger by saying that the provision had
already been breached—when the 10-day period ended—and that merger did not apply to
already existing causes of action, a more acceptable explanation.)
Finally, the executory sales contract can expressly provide that some of its provisions are
intended to “survive” the closing of escrow. Utilization of a survival clause should not only
ensure the continuation of a provision important to one of the parties, but also reduces the need
for litigation in order to prove it. It is probably the cheapest as well as the most effective way to
deal with this issue.
Another, different version of the merger doctrine operates to consolidate smaller interests
and estates in land into larger ones, but with sometimes more dangerous consequences. If a
neighbor had an easement across Blackacre and then acquired the fee to that parcel, his
continued walking along the old road is no longer explained as exercise of his (former) easement,
but instead as one of the activities an owner of the fee (in the newly acquired Blackacre) may
engage in as part of his right of possession as owner of a possessory estate, his smaller easement
having merged into his larger fee. This doctrine was mainly created to eliminate the clutter of
having too many interests in land fragmenting titles, but it can generate undesirable
consequences for incautious parties. For instance, the foreclosure of a senior mortgage is
generally intended to wipe out all of the interests of both the mortgagor and any junior
mortgagee in the same property, thereby allowing the foreclosing mortgagee to sell a complete
title to the high bidder at his foreclosure. But if the junior mortgage interest was not properly
included in that foreclosure, it was not then eliminated, and the bidder acquired the former
interests of the senior and the mortgagor, which then may be held to have merged into a title that
is subject to the old junior mortgage—now elevated into senior position. Most courts have found
ways to avoid such an absurd application of merger law; the Restatement of Mortgages proposes
its complete abolition in the mortgage field. But some courts still employ the doctrine; the
possibility that it could arise to cause mischief means that it probably takes a lawsuit to get past
it. That sort of merger trap requires entirely different avoidance strategies not covered in this
column, but see my article Mortgages and Merger in ABA Probate and Property, Vol. 26, No. 6
(2012) (also reproduced on my website at http://rogerbernhardt.com/index.php/ceb-columns).
This Contract
The provision in this case obligated the sellers to disclose all information they had
materially affecting the value of their property. The question for the court was whether it
survived the close of escrow. One would normally expect buyers to use such a disclosure
provision before rather than after closing, during the 10-day period that the contract gave them to
do their due diligence; it also then permitted them to withdraw in their “sole discretion.” Thus, its
apparent role was probably to assist the purchasers in deciding whether to back out—within that
first 10 days—rather than to belatedly generate or eliminate their remorse if they had already
closed without backing out. I would therefore expect the provision to operate pre-close, but I
would also expect it not to operate post-close. I would not expect a court to hold that such a
clause ordinarily survived past the close of escrow. When a covenanting seller had affirmatively

refused to disclose a material fact, I would expect her buyer to be entitled to refuse to close, and
perhaps to sue for breach, but I would not think that her buyer instead could close escrow, take
title, and then bring his damage or rescission action. When the seller has not disclosed but the
buyer has not realized it, the suit is inevitably post-close, and probably subject to a 4-year statute
of limitations starting either on the expiration of the 10-day period or the close of escrow. (The
court seemed to think the end of the 10 days was the trigger.)
What Should You Do if You Don’t Want a Provision to Survive?
Since none of the covenants implied in a California grant deed covers disclosures, and since
disclosure provision survival seems generally unlikely, it is hard for me to understand a
conclusion that it could survive, and even harder to assume that the purchasers can prove that it
did survive. But I do not make the rules, and now we all must operate under a rule that a
disclosure provision can survive the close of escrow and allow a purchaser to complete the
purchase and thereafter sue for breach of a disclosure provision in the contract. Counsel should
not have the confidence to advise their clients that they can always count on being able to
enforce the disclosure provisions in their contracts even though they have already closed escrow,
just because Ram’s Gate was able to do so.
I was also somewhat dubious of the value of insisting on (and paying extra for) a contractual
disclosure provision, since the duty to disclose all facts materially affecting the value of the
property being sold is already imposed on vendors as a matter of tort law (Lingsch v Savage
(1963) 213 CA2d 729), which does not need to be paid for. But to whatever degree a buyer
believes that such a clause adds value to his purchase, then it obviously adds even more value if
it lasts longer by virtue of surviving the close of escrow and endures even longer than liability
for tortious nondisclosure does.
But if I wanted such enduring protection, I would not stop with just including a contractual
obligation to disclose, simply hoping that it will last. (The trial judge did not think the clause
survived; it required an appeal by the purchasers to get the outcome they wanted.) More careful
drafting—including an explicit survival characterization in the provision itself, as well as
including the provision in any overall list of surviving obligations found elsewhere in the
contract—would have been a good deal cheaper and surer. Indeed, really good drafting might
even convert an otherwise short-lived provision into a long-lasting one.
Some Puzzling Questions
Two other features of this case intrigued me and might affect outcomes in related situations
.
Why Did the Purchasers Abandon Their Tort Claims?

I wonder why the purchasers abandoned the tort causes of action that they had originally
pleaded, electing to stand solely on their contract theory. Their fraud and negligent
misrepresentation claims pretty much depended on the same facts as did their breach of contract
claim, so what led them to do so? Three possible reasons occurred to me, and there may be some
lessons to learn from that.

First, perhaps the purchasers were concerned that the statute of limitations for tort claims
had already run. The limitations period for fraud (and probably also for negligent
misrepresentation) is 3 years from discovery (CCP §338(d); see also CC §1572(2)). These
purchasers had waited more than 3 years after the end of the 10-day period and the close of
escrow (although less than 3 years from the date of their claimed discovery) to file suit. The
claimed late discovery might stretch those time periods, but there was evidence that they had
been advised about the fault line at the time of purchase. On the other hand, a breach of contract
cause of action would give them 4 years after their purchase to commence their litigation, thus
making all those dates obsolete. A litigator analyzing the nondisclosure claims of a somewhat
stale purchaser might breathe a sigh of relief in finding a good disclosure clause in the contract
and amend the complaint accordingly.
Or perhaps the purchasers thought that it would be too difficult to prove all of the elements
required in a tort cause of action. Fraud needs an intent to defraud, whereas breach of contract
does not. What if the sellers had merely forgotten to mention the old earthquake fault? Negligent
representation may require some affirmative misstatement, a case harder to make if there was
merely a failure to say anything about the old fault. These might not be considerations to worry
about in a contact claim, where nonperformance of the provision should be enough without
more, regardless of whether intentional or inadvertent, or whether by silence or affirmative
statement. It’s a much easier case when there is a contractual provision than when there isn’t.
Finally, perhaps the purchasers feared that the “economic loss” rule would prevent them
from recovering sufficient damages in a purely tort action, even if they could prove the rest of
their case. That rule could confine their recovery to physical or personal injuries and exclude
simple loss of value, which is recoverable only in a contract rather than a tort case. Nothing in
the opinion indicates that any physical damage to persons or property was caused by
concealment or nondisclosure of the earthquake fault, so their claim that the land was worth less
because of its proximity to the fault line could arguably be rejected as only an economic loss, not
recoverable in a tort action. I think it is pretty clear that that rule has been displaced by the
provision of our fraudulent sales statute, CC §3343, which measures liability by “the difference
between the actual value of that with which the defrauded person parted and the actual value of
that which he received” regardless of whether there were personal or physical injuries.
Conversely, however, I do not see any significant evidence that it has also been displaced in
California in a negligent misrepresentation case—a position that seems to have been adopted
only in Texas. See D.S.A., Inc. v Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist. (Tex 1998) 973 SW2d 662.
Time in Tort

Another area of uncertainty is how the time of discovery can affect the rights of the
purchaser. I regard that topic as uncertain because we do not have all the rules we need to give
solid advice to clients. Moving somewhat jerkily along a calendar from the beginning to the end
of a deal will illustrate my concerns.
If the purchaser observes the defect before he has even made an offer, no issue is likely to
arise: Either he does not then make an offer, or his offer requires the vendor to correct the
problem, or the offered price is reduced. There is probably no chance that a purchaser who has
already observed a defect can fail to mention it in his offer and then later demand that it be
remedied.

If the purchaser observes the defect after his offer has been made and accepted, the due
diligence rights in his contract probably cover the situation and describe his courses of action.
Many contracts have provisions giving purchasers a certain number of days to satisfy themselves
about the property’s condition and allowing them a complete right to back out if they so choose.
(See my column The Cost of Free Looks—Ruminations on Steiner v Thexton, 33 CEB RPLR 61
(May 2010), available on my website at http://rogerbernhardt.com/index.php/ceb-columns.) Or
they can choose to bargain further, threatening to withdraw—in their “sole and absolute
discretion”—with considerably more strength than otherwise.
The discovery of defects after the close of escrow is probably the most common of all the
situations. Everyone understands that that is generally when tort actions begin rather than end.
Ram’s Gate adds that even a contract action can still lie. Just beware of the statute of limitations.
What to do about a defect discovered when there is no backout provision or its time period is
over, but before escrow has closed, is where we are somewhat in the dark. Does the ending of the
inspection period mean that the contract has become truly and unconditionally binding on a
purchaser, regardless of what he has learned? Or does his permitting escrow to close thereafter
mean that he has thereby waived all his previous rights to say or do something about the defect? I
would expect litigators to be very cautious in advising their clients about prospects of success
when this is the case. (One decision—Jue v Smiser (1994) 23 CA4th 312, reported at 17 CEB
RPLR 233 (July 1994)—did allow a purchaser who discovered a key defect just one day before
closing to complete his purchase and thereafter file suit, but the facts may be too specific to
support a broad sounding rule.)
Overall, the Ram’s Gate decision gives buyers and sellers of land much to chew on.
From Real Property Law Reporter (Cal CEB [July 2015) © The Regents of the University of California,
reprinted with permission of CEB

